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1. Introduction
Debates over the philosophical foundations of statistics have a long and fascinat-
ing history; the decline of a lively exchange between philosophers of science and
statisticians is relatively recent. Is there something special about 2011 (and
beyond) that calls for renewed engagement in these ﬁelds? I say yes. There
are some surprising, pressing, and intriguing new philosophical twists on the
long-running controversies that cry out for philosophical analysis, and I hope to
galvanize my co-contributors as well as the reader to take up the general cause.
It is ironic that statistical science and philosophy of science—so ahead of
their time in combining the work of philosophers and practicing scientists1—
should now ﬁnd such dialogues rare, especially at a time when philosophy of
science has come to see itself as striving to be immersed in, and relevant to,
scientiﬁc practice. I will have little to say about why this has occurred, although
I do not doubt there is a good story there, with strands colored by philosophy,
sociology, economics, and trends in other ﬁelds. I want instead to take some
steps toward answering our question: Where and why should we meet from
this point forward?I begin with some core themes, concepts, and questions, and
with why we have collected statisticians, econometricians, and philosophers of
science in a room for two days in June at the London School of Economics (it was
air-conditioned!) to further the dialogue.
1.1 Meeting on a Two-Way Street
Despite the challenges and changes in traditional philosophy of science, at least
one of its central jobs is or ought to be to clarify and help resolve the concep-
tual, logical, and methodological discomforts of scientists, especially in a ﬁeld
like statistics, which deals with issues of scientiﬁc knowledge, evidence, and in-
ference. So philosophy of science should be relevant to foundational debates in
statistics. At the same time, philosophers are interested in solving long-standing
problems about evidence and inference, and ideas from probability and statistics
have long been appealed to for that purpose. So advances in statistical science
should be relevant to philosophy of science. Now, few philosophers of science
doubt that science is successful and that it makes progress. A core philosophical
problem, to put it in untraditional terms, is how to justify this lack of skepticism.
Any adequate explanation of the success of science would have to square with
the fact of limited data, with unobserved and unobservable phenomena, with
theories underdetermined by data, and with all of the slings and arrows of the
threat of error.
As such, we might put the central question of relevance to both philosophy of
science and statistics as: How do we learn about the world despite limited data
and threats of error?
1 See for example the proceedings in Godambe and Sprott 1971; Harper and Hooker 1976.Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 81
1.2 Inductive Inference as ‘Evidence Transcending’
The risk of error enters because we want to ﬁnd things out—reach claims or
take action—based on limited information. As with any inductive argument, we
want to move beyond the data to claims that are ‘evidence transcending’. The
premises can be true while the conclusion inferred may be false—without a logi-
cal contradiction. Conceiving of inductive inference, very generally, as ‘evidence-
transcending’ or ‘ampliative’ reasoning frees us to talk about induction without
presupposing certain special forms this can take. Notably, while mathematical
probability arises in inductive inference, there are two rival positions as to its
role:
• to quantify the degree of conﬁdence, belief, or support to assign to a hy-
pothesis or claim given data x; and
• to quantify how reliably probed, well-tested, or corroborated a claim is
given data x.
This contrast is at the heart of a philosophical scrutiny of statistical accounts.
In the ﬁrst, an inference to H might be merited to the extent that H is highly
probable; in the second, to the extent that H is highly probed; alternatively,
the goal might be in terms of comparatively probable, or comparatively severely
probed. However, there are different ways to cash out the entry of probability
under both headings; so I deliberately leave them in a rough form for now.
1.3 Relevance for Statistical Science Practice
I would never be so bold as to suggest that a lack of clarity about philosophical
foundations in any way hampers progress in statistical practice. Only in certain
moments do practitioners need a philosophical or self-reﬂective standpoint. Yet
those moments, I maintain, are increasingly common.
Even though statistical science (as with other sciences) generally goes about
its business without attending to its own foundations, implicit in every statisti-
cal methodology are core ideas that direct its principles, methods, and interpre-
tations. I will call this its statistical philosophy. Yet the same statistical method
may and usually does admit of more than one statistical philosophy. When faced
with new types of problems or puzzling cases, or when disagreement between
accounts arises, there is a need to scrutinize the underlying statistical philoso-
phies. Too often the associated statistical philosophies remain hidden in such
foundational debates, in the very place we most need to see them revealed. But,
then, we need to elucidate precisely what it means to scrutinize a statistical
method philosophically (section 4.1).
1.4 Joyful Eclecticism or a Mixture of Conﬂicting Methods?
From one perspective, we may see contemporary statistics as a place of happy
eclecticism: the wealth of computational ability allows for the application of
countless methods with little hand-wringing about foundations. Contemporary
practitioners may work blissfully free of the old frequentist-Bayesian controver-82 Deborah G. Mayo
sies; younger statisticians, even when waxing philosophical, seem only distantly
aware of them. Doesn’t this show that we may have reached ‘the end of statisti-
cal foundations’?
My take is just the opposite. Only through philosophical scrutiny can we
understand the wealth of formal machinery and, most especially, critically ap-
praise its. Some statisticians suggest that throwing different and competing
methods at a problem is all to the good, that it increases the chances that at
least one will be right. This may be so, but one needs to understand how to in-
terpret competing answers and relate them to one another, which takes us back
to philosophical underpinnings.
1.5 Even Shallow Drilling Reveals Issues of Statistical Philosophy
One need not drill too far below the surface of many contemporary discussions
of statistical method in order to discern a deep (and also deeply interesting) lack
of clarity, if not unease, at the foundational level. Today’s debates clearly differ
from the Bayesian-frequentist debates of old. In fact, some of those same dis-
cussants of statistical philosophy, who only a decade ago were arguing for the
‘irreconciliability’ of frequentist p-values and (Bayesian) measures of evidence,
are now calling for ways to ‘unify’ or ‘reconcile’ frequentist and Bayesian ac-
counts, often in the form of one or another ‘nonsubjective’ or ‘default’ Bayesian
paradigms. These attempts—the debates they’ve triggered and our reactions
to them—give us a place to begin to discuss where, on what common ground,
statistical science and philosophy of science might meet.
The reasons some statisticians give for contemporary frequentist-Bayesian
uniﬁcations are both philosophical and pragmatic. For one thing, despite the
growing use of computerized programs that readily enable Bayesian analyses,
frequentist methods have not disappeared as they were supposed to, and en-
suring low error probabilities remains a desideratum scientists are unwilling to
forgo. For another thing, there is the concern that methodological conﬂicts may
be bad for the profession:
“We [statisticians] are not blameless [...] we have not made a con-
certed professional effort to provide the scientiﬁc world with a uni-
ﬁed testing methodology [...] and so are tacit accomplices in the
unfortunate statistical situation.” (Berger 2003, 4)
Some Bayesians claim that frequentist methods cannot deal with the complex
multiparameter situations of current practice, but this is belied by leading sta-
tistical modelers (see contribution by Aris Spanos). Any lingering doubts about
frequentist methods being able to handle large numbers of variables are re-
moved by David Hendry’s econometric methodology, which intertwines model
discovery with an iterative series of model validation-tests, all while controlling
error probabilities (see the contribution by David Hendry).Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 83
1.6 “An Important Task of Our Time”
The advantage of a frequentist-Bayesian uniﬁcation, many claim, is to ensure
that answers are conditional on the data actually obtained while at the same
time respecting the frequentist notion that the methodology must ensure success
in repeated usage by scientists (Berger 2006, 388).
However, these twin goals turn out to conﬂict with one another! Thus the
increased use of nonsubjective Bayesianism in general, and the attempts at ‘rec-
onciliation’ in particular, have, at least implicitly, put foundational issues back
on the map, despite not always being noticed. Nonsubjective Bayesian meth-
ods permit violations of fundamental principles long held as integral to what
subjective (or personalistic) Bayesians consider the ‘Bayesian standpoint’ (e.g.,
Lindley 1997). With good reason, leading subjective Bayesian statisticians are
at the forefront in confronting their fallen brethren. It is as if some of the gen-
erals from the earlier (Bayesian-frequentist) statistics battles were wondering
just who (if anyone) had won the statistics wars. Take Jay Kadane (2008, 457;
emphasis added):
“The growth in use and popularity of Bayesian methods has stunned
many of us who were involved in exploring their implications decades
ago. The result [...] is that there are users of these methods who do
not understand the philosophical basis of the methods they are us-
ing, and hence may misinterpret or badly use the results [...]. No
doubt helping people to use Bayesian methods more appropriately is
an important task of our time.”
I quite agree with Kadane as to the importance of the task. In addressing it,
however, we must ask: Can contemporary statistical practitioners be ‘helped’
to use Bayesian methods in the manner deemed appropriate by the personalist
founders? Is there just one philosophical basis for a given set of methods?
Clearly not. Among frequentist founders, for instance, R. A. Fisher is readily
acknowledged to have embraced a philosophical foundation different from those
embodied by Neyman and Pearson. Even within those schools there are compet-
ing evidential vs. behavioristic interpretations and foundations. The differences
between contemporary default Bayesians and subjective Bayesians, many think,
are even more dramatic than the differences between Fisherian and Neyman-
Pearsonian frequentists (see Stephen Senn’s contribution). Kadane’s ‘important
task’ is indeed important, and it is philosophical. Arguing for one rather than
another way to use and interpret a given formal methodology is a crucial task
for contemporary philosophy of statistics. For it is in these arguments that a
statistical science-philosophy of science meeting ground, of relevance to current
practice, will emerge.
1.7 The Philosophical Doctor Is In
As thorny as these philosophical problems are, we can get a handle on them by
looking to a handful of questions:84 Deborah G. Mayo
• What are the roles of probability in inductive/statistical inference in sci-
ence?
• What are the goals/functions of inductive/statistical inference in relation
to scientiﬁc inquiry?
These queries will guide us as we reexamine the philosophical basis of the math-
ematical methods of statistics, both old and new. They require that we ask:
• What can various methods be used for?
The answer is distinct from what a method’s founders may have had in mind,
and from textbook accounts. It demands that we stand ‘one level removed’ from
common interpretations and applications of methods. For example, Bayesian
methods may be adequate for updating prior degrees of belief in an exhaustive
set of hypotheses, but many deny that this is the only or even the best use of
these methods. Likewise, standard frequentist methods, e.g., hypotheses tests
and conﬁdence interval estimation procedures, may be adequate for the goal
of ensuring low long-run frequencies of erroneous inferences (or decisions), but
they may be used for rather different goals in the contexts of the scientiﬁc in-
quiry which is my focus.
I do not want to rehash the ‘statistics wars’ that have raged in every decade
from the 1960s to the present, even though the so-called ‘signiﬁcance test con-
troversy’ is still hotly debated among practitioners (in psychology, epidemiology,
ecology, economics), and even though it can sometimes seem that each genera-
tion is ﬁghting these wars anew—with journalistic reforms, and with task forces
set up to stem reﬂexive, recipe like uses of statistics that have long been de-
plored. I have discussed these debates at length elsewhere, and although this
discussion will have implications for resolving them that is not where I propose
to begin today.2 If we are to make progress in resolving these decades-old con-
troversies, which still shake the foundations of statistics, as well as tackle new
ones, we need to dig (or drill?) not shallowly but deeply, a task that requires both
statistical and philosophical acumen. The drilling analogy seems especially apt
given the obsession (in the U.S.) with the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico during
the 2010 summer of our initial forum, and I retain it here.
The job of the philosopher is to clarify but also to provoke reﬂection and
scrutiny precisely in those areas that go unchallenged in our ordinary lives and
practices. My remarks may well be provocative to all existing sides of the debate
about the roles of probability and statistics in scientiﬁc inquiry and learning.
2. Induction and Error
2.1 Probability and Induction
Whether probability purports to be used to quantify degrees of belief/support, or
to capture degrees of well-testedness/corroboration, or the like, we do not have
2 See for example Mayo 1985, 1992, 1996; Mayo and Cox 2010; Mayo and Spanos 2006, 2010, 2011.Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 85
an inductive inference until we detach some claim or assertion (be it probabilistic
or other). The following conditional, for example, would not be considered an
inductive inference:
If a weighing experiment is adequately modeled as independent and
identically distributed (iid) random variables from a normal distri-
bution with mean ¹, standard deviation ¾, then the probability of the
95% conﬁdence interval estimation procedure containing the true
value of ¹ is .95.
Even adding a prior-probability distribution to this same conditional, and de-
ducing a posterior probability for parameter(s) ¹ (and/or ¾), is not yet to make
an inductive inference, as I am using the term. Once it is granted (ideally by
adequate checking) that the antecedent assumptions of the model (and in the
latter case, the prior) hold, various inductive inferences are possible. It is true
that ‘inference’ can refer to the entire argument or to the particular conclusion,
but that is not the point. The conclusion inferred, to be genuinely inductive (or
ampliative), must take the leap of going beyond the premises.
An inductive inference from a standard frequentist method might take the
form:
(i) The data indicate that my weight is 130 pounds (generally with a speciﬁc
approximation interval given).
Or the inference might just be the detached claim:
(ii) My weight is less than 130 pounds,
accompanied by the reliability characteristics of the estimation procedure.
A Bayesian inference might take the form:
(iii) The posterior probability that my weight is less than 130 pounds is .95.
Many other variations of both frequentist and Bayesian inferences are possible.
Both accounts require background information to arrive at the model for the
phenomenon, to specify the data generation technique, and to check the ade-
quacy of a statistical model for data x. These tasks demand their own inferences.
2.2 Statistical Science: Learning Despite Error
We deliberately used ‘statistical science’ in our forum title because it may be
understood broadly to include the full gamut of statistical methods, from exper-
imental design, generation, analysis, and modeling of data to using statistical
inference to answer scientiﬁc questions. (Even more broadly, we might include
a variety of formal but nonprobabilistic methods in computer science and engi-
neering, as well as machine learning.) Since statistical science directs itself to
achieving these tasks in the face of limited information, uncertainty, and error, it
stands to reason that its methods would be relevant to the general philosophical
one (one of the arrows on the two-way street).
Statistical methods, as I see them, provide techniques for modeling, checking
and avoiding, and learning from these mistakes. This conception of statistics is86 Deborah G. Mayo
sufﬁciently general to embrace any of the philosophies of statistics now on offer,
even though each requires its own interpretation (to which we will return). It
does not readily lend itself to a single overarching ‘logic’ of the sort to which
philosophers of science sometimes look. The difference between these empirical
and highly context-dependent uses of statistical methods, and the philosophi-
cal pastime of erecting overarching logics to relate evidence statements and hy-
potheses, reveals an obstacle to ﬁnding a meeting ground for philosophy of sci-
ence and statistical science. Only by removing this obstacle can statistical ideas
be used to solve problems philosophers care about, which gives us a shot at ob-
taining an account of ampliative inference relevant to actual scientiﬁc learning.
2.3 Twin Goals: Reliability and Informativeness
While philosophers tend to draw skeptical lessons from the fact that error is
always possible, statistical practitioners focus on speciﬁc threats to the validity
of their inferences and claims of evidence. Philosophers of science can learn
from this: if we want to understand how we manage to be so successful despite
the threat of error, we should look not at the worst cases but at where and how
humans learn despite error. The fundamental role of statistical concepts and
methods, as I see it, is to provide a growing machinery to capture and cope with
some canonical types of errors that arise across a wide range of areas.
On the one hand, we want a method that recognizes the error-proneness
of inductive learning; on the other, we do not want the error-control to be so
extreme that little of informative signiﬁcance is learned. Another way to put
this is that we want both reliability (of tests) and (informativeness) of claims
inferred. Focusing on the character of error probing, discriminating, amplifying,
and learning from error seems a promising way to locate essential features of
inductive learning.
I do not mean formal statistical errors, but general mistakes in inference,
such as erroneously inferring a genuine (as opposed to a spurious) effect, mis-
takes about parameters (whether in a theory or a statistical model), mistakes
about causal processes or mechanisms, and mistakes about the adequacy of a
model—both for arriving at a statistical inference, and, separately, for learning
about some phenomenon of interest.
2.4 Frequentist Error Statistics
Frequentist statistics employs the frequentist notion of probability, but to say
this is scarcely to capture its essential ingredients. The key ingredient, just from
the formal statistical perspective, is the use of probabilities to quantify the error
rates in applying a (test or estimation) procedure. For instance, a signiﬁcance
test T appeals to probability to assess the proportion of cases in which a null
hypothesis H0 would be rejected in a hypothetical series of repeated uses of test
T, when in fact H0 is true. This is an error probability. Note that an error
probability is associated with a method for inference or testing.Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 87
Imagine I weighed in at 130 pounds before my trip to London and I wish to
investigate if there has been any weight gain upon returning, using a number
of scales with known precisions. My weight is an unknown ﬁxed parameter (at
this moment), as would be any weight increase ±. A typical null hypothesis is:
H0 : ±Æ0
(or the inference may specify an upper bound to the increased weight).
In general, there is a test procedure T that leads from data on measurements,
x, to hypotheses about the data generating procedure—here, my weight. T’s
reliability refers to notions such as: the probability test T erroneously outputs
‘x indicates H0’ (no increase from 130 pounds). Here is an example of a reliable
test for this case: Infer that no more than one pound has been gained only when
none of the three different scales of known precision detects an increase, even
though they readily discern the addition of a one-ounce potato.
A Bayesian analysis would consider a prior distribution on the unknown
ﬁxed weight. But given that the problem stipulates a ﬁxed weight, what can
the prior here be interpreted as? Bayesians might construe the prior as repre-
senting a degree of prior belief in different values I might weigh, or they might
use a ‘default’ prior distribution. This leads to a posterior probability in H0 that
I have not gained weight. The error statistician and the Bayesian (of either
stripe) are asking distinct questions. C. S. Peirce, writing in the late nineteenth
century, captures the error-statistical spirit:
“The theory here proposed does not assign any probability to the
inductive or hypothetic conclusion, in the sense of undertaking to
say how frequently that conclusion would be found true. It does not
propose to look through all the possible universes, and say in what
proportion of them a certain uniformity occurs; such a proceeding,
were it possible, would be quite idle. The theory here presented only
says how frequently, in this universe, the special form of induction or
hypothesis would lead us right. The probability given by this theory
is in every way different—in meaning, numerical value, and form—
from that of those who would apply to ampliative inference the doc-
trine of inverse chances.” (Peirce 1931–1935, vol. 2, para. 748)
However, the Bayesian procedure might also be construed as a general rule, just
like test T, and Peirce’s question might be: How frequently, in this universe,
would the method lead us right?—an error-statistical query. One might ask,
for example: What is the probability of a high posterior in H0 even if it is false?
This might be construed as placing an error-statistical analysis upon a Bayesian
method, and some Bayesian-frequentist reconciliations take this form. Without
great care as to what is varying (the random variable? Or also the parameter?),
the result can differ greatly from a genuine error-statistical assessment.88 Deborah G. Mayo
2.5 Error-Statistical Methods as Tools for Severe Testing
It is ironic that gestures toward reconciling frequentist and Bayesian methods
make a point of showing that recommended techniques have good success rates
in repeated usage, given that the central criticism traditionally leveled at fre-
quentist methods questions the relevance of low long-run error rates to partic-
ular inferences. The latter appeals to a ‘behavioristic goal’—one will not often
‘act’ erroneously regarding a phenomenon in the long run—whereas we want
an ‘evidential’ construal for the case at hand. I agree. Long-run reliability is a
necessary but insufﬁcient use of tests, and properly interpreted error-statistical
tests may be used to control and scrutinize how well or severely tested a given
hypothesis is with speciﬁc data x. (It is the uniﬁcationist promoting long-run
performance who owes us a rationale!)
Consider my example of inferring an upper bound for weight gain using
well-calibrated scales. While it is true that the method is reliable—that by fol-
lowing such a procedure in the long run one would rarely report weight gains
erroneously—that is not the rationale we demand for the particular inference.
Rather, the justiﬁcation is that were I to have gained more than d pounds, the
test would have, with high probability, revealed this in one of my checks. The
claim that x is evidence that ¹ is less than ¹0, we might say, has passed a strin-
gent or severe test. Likewise, a nonstatistically signiﬁcant difference x is poor
evidence for ¹ Ç ¹0 if such an insigniﬁcant result would occur with high proba-
bility, even if ¹ were as great as ¹0. In that case our assertion passes with low
severity. This reﬂects what I consider a minimal principle of evidence.
Use of frequentist methods for this kind of evidential appraisal may be called
a severe testing account based on error statistics. Although frequentist methods
do not (usually) directly supply a severity assessment, they may be used for this
aim, and I take that as their philosophical justiﬁcation. The severity concept
(any number of analogous terms might be used) supplies the formal frequentist
methods with a statistical philosophy. It avoids the classic criticisms of frequen-
tist methods while enjoying a sound foundation: it lets us determine what we
have and have not learned. Its advantages with respect to the task of grounding
the use of statistical models is a distinct topic which I leave to others (see the
contribution by Aris Spanos). On the philosophical side, the severity interpreta-
tion of frequentist statistics might enable the right-headed element in Popper to
be fruitfully implemented by current day ‘critical rationalists’ (see Max Albert’s
contribution).
3. A Platform on Which to Meet
Here then is a place to look to meet directly with a host of foundational problems
current in statistics: the discussions of ‘uniﬁcations’ or ‘reconciliations’ between
Bayesian and frequentist methods. Certainly it was the current work on recon-
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battles. There are at least two kinds of ‘meetings’ represented in these purported
uniﬁcations: ﬁrst, between frequentist and Bayesian methods, but also, between
statistical methodology and epistemology of science. It is precisely the tensions
to which both kinds of meeting grounds give rise that reveal where current foun-
dational issues come up against basic philosophical assumptions (about the role
of probability in inductive learning, and the role of formal statistical tools).
3.1 Frequentist-Bayesian Uniﬁcations
Granting that “agreement on statistical philosophy is not on the immediate hori-
zon”, Jim Berger will “focus less on what is correct philosophically than on ‘what
is correct methodologically’” (Berger 2003). His allusion to philosophical agree-
ment seeming to be far off suggests that professional philosophers are at least
wrestling with the issue. By and large, they have not been part of the contem-
porary debate. I hope to forge a shift in this status quo. Since a successful
uniﬁcation must be thought to satisfy the fundamental goals or the minimal
requirements of frequentist and Bayesian accounts, looking at attempted uniﬁ-
cations is very revealing as to presuppositions about those goals.
In one key paper, Berger (2003) purports to produce a piece de resistance:
an account of testing to which Jeffreys, Fisher, and Neyman could have agreed.
But if he really can produce the low long-run errors of methods that frequen-
tists demand, then wouldn’t the entire method fall under the frequentist (error-
statistical) umbrella? In fact it turns out that he is using the notion of an ‘error
probability’ in a different manner, i.e., as a posterior probability assignment to
a parameter, even though the parameter is regarded as ﬁxed.
So what shall we say to Berger’s suggestion about agreeing on methodology
without philosophy? If there is an agreement on numbers despite different inter-
pretations and different intended questions being asked of data, it cannot lead
to the sound professional concordance he seeks. So his task implicitly calls for
foundational work.
3.2 Difﬁdent Bayesianism
Contemporary work on Bayesian-frequentist uniﬁcations offers the frequentist
error statistician a clearer and less contentious (re)entry into statistical foun-
dations than when Bayesian ‘personalists’ reigned (e.g., Lindley, Savage). Con-
fronted with the position that “arguments for this personalistic theory were so
persuasive that anything to any extent inconsistent with that theory should be
discarded” (Cox 2006, 196), frequentists might have seen themselves in a kind
of exile when it came to foundations, even those who had been active in the di-
alogues of an earlier period. Sometime around the late 1990s there were signs
that this was changing. Once again I will resist trying to explain why this oc-
curred, but that it occurred is of central importance to statistical philosophy.
Unlike their subjectivist predecessors, the Bayesian statisticians leading the
uniﬁcations favor the use of what we may call ‘nonsubjective’ Bayesian priors
if only to avoid letting scientists’ subjective beliefs overshadow the information90 Deborah G. Mayo
provided by data. Here, prior probability distributions arise from a variety of
formal considerations. (These nonsubjective Bayesian paradigms have their own
history in statistics and philosophy, notably, in the work of Jeffreys and Carnap,
respectively.)
With the early attempts, the dream of priors that leave inference pure and
unadulterated could still be entertained; nowadays it is conceded (at least by
statisticians) that “non informative priors do not exist” (Bernardo 1997). The
old dream has been replaced by ﬁnding conventional or ‘default’ choices of prior
distributions for parameters of statistical models that reﬂect a lack of subjective
information. The impressive technical complexities notwithstanding, the result
has been a multiplicity of incompatible ways to go about this, none obviously
superior (Bernardo 2010).3 So the desired ‘agreement on numbers’ has yet to
materialize even within the nonsubjective Bayesian family; one may pick one
technique, be it Bernardo’s or Berger’s or another’s, but an interpretation and
foundation is still needed (see Jan Sprenger’s contribution).
3.3 A Plethora of Foundational Problems
By ﬁnding nonsubjective priors we can (at times) get posteriors that match error
probabilities. In so doing, some claim, we both recover current (frequentist)
statistical practice while giving it the philosophical foundation it lacks. The
trouble is that neither holds up: the error probabilities that match the posterior
may no longer supply either the frequentist error probabilities or the celebrated
philosophical foundations. A word on each:
In some cases the nonsubjective posteriors may have good error-statistical
properties of the proper frequentist sort, at least in the asymptotic long run.
But then another concern arises: If the default Bayesian has merely given us
technical tricks to achieve frequentist goals, as some suspect, then why consider
them Bayesian (Cox 2006)? Wasserman (2008, 464) puts it bluntly: If the Bayes’
estimator has good frequency-error probabilities, then we might as well use the
frequentist method. If it has bad frequency behavior then we shouldn’t use it.
(The situation is even more problematic for those of us who insist on a relevant
severity warrant.)
Subjective Bayesians are not much happier with the uniﬁcations. They focus
too much on technique at the expense of the ‘Bayesian standpoint’ (i.e., updat-
ing degrees of belief, says Dennis Lindley (1997), commenting on Bernardo).
Whereas in the subjective Bayesian standpoint, the fundamental role for the
prior was formally to incorporate into inductive inference an agent’s degree of
belief, apart from the data and statistical model, the nonsubjective priors are
model-dependent, and are not even intended to represent beliefs. (They are often
not even probabilities.) The recommended conventional priors lead to Bayesian
incoherence, thwarting what had long been taken as the heart of Bayesian foun-
dations. Several Bayesians complain that the cottage industry that has grown
3 Even in simple problems, recommended Bayesian procedures differ. See the deﬁnitive review by
Kass and Wasserman (1996).Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 91
up for ﬁnding default priors is taking practitioners away from more important
work.
3.4 Bayesian Family Feuds
A forum in Bayesian Analysis (vol. 1, no. 3, 2006) exempliﬁes the kind of philo-
sophical family feuding that is common in current practice, with or without
non-Bayesian frequentist input (usually without). The representatives are Jim
Berger and Michael Goldstein, representing default Bayesianism and subjec-
tive Bayesian practice, respectively. Remarkably, both lead papers (and others
in the discussion) show the disintegration of traditional Bayesian foundations.
Jim Berger’s position is not uncommon: even if, in his heart of hearts, he believes
that Bayesian updating provides authentic philosophical reasoning in contexts
of updating subjective degrees of belief, Bayesians should, in practice, adopt
some standard default priors.
“The (arguably correct) view that science should embrace subjective statis-
tics falls on deaf ears; they come to statistics in large part because they wish
it to provide objective validation of their science.” (Berger 2006, 388) Subjec-
tive elicitation is not only unreliable, he feels, it detracts from the more serious
problem of model speciﬁcation. Further, the use of default priors combats what
he terms “pseudo-Bayesian” subjectivism, wherein prior probabilities with poor
performance characteristics are adopted under the banner of subjectivity.
Despite his role as defender of subjective Bayesianism, Goldstein says he
“cannot remember ever seeing a non-trivial Bayesian analysis which actually
proceeded according to the usual Bayes formalism”. Like Berger, I ﬁnd it inter-
esting to note that he “is not making a ringing endorsement of what is perceived
as standard subjective Bayesian analysis”. This seems increasingly common,
even when it comes to advocating the use of Bayesian updating itself: “There is
no stronger reason why there should be a rule for going from prior to posterior
beliefs than that there should be such a rule for constructing prior beliefs in the
ﬁrst place.” (Goldstein 2006, 414) The need to avoid ‘betting incoherency’ seems
to have gone by the wayside as a kind of justiﬁcation, as opposed to a tautolo-
gous result for contexts where all the ‘givens’ are granted. The status among
philosophers of probability is less clear. (Howson appears to reject appeals to
Dutch Books beginning in 1997.)
While Bayesianism is appealed to for philosophical foundations, in practice it
is toward reference or default Bayesian priors that many look (Kass and Wasser-
man 1996); so any philosophical problems it faces are relevant to a large part of
current Bayesian practice, which in turn is relevant to Bayesian philosophy of
science.
3.5 Disinterring Frequentist Roots?
There are plenty of practitioners wearing Bayesian hats who are not members
of (or even reject) the uniﬁcationist movement. Here, too, however, there seems
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a great variety of domains. The methods advocated throw together likelihoods,
priors (of all stripes), sampling distributions, conditioning, signiﬁcance tests,
conﬁdence intervals, subjective and default priors, linear models, and everything
else in the statistical kitchen sink.
Having abandoned the traditional foundational justiﬁcations, these Bayesians
tend to defend their methods by pointing to their ‘usefulness’. The question of
what if any general principles, reasoning strategies, or underlying rationales are
actually responsible for the results they value is left glaringly open. We cannot
credit a method for a useful result without being clear that it is because of the
method.
The last decade or more has also given rise to many new problem areas that
call for novel methods (e.g., machine learning). Do they call for new foundations?
Or, can existing foundations be relevant here too? (See Larry Wasserman’s con-
tribution). A lack of clarity on the foundations of existing methods tends to leave
these new domains in foundational limbo. Some discussions reveal widespread
unclarity about the nature of frequentist statistics. Bayesian critics agree on
one thing: frequentist methods license a handful of ‘hilarious’ examples, often
described just before turning to the preferred Bayesian approach (Ghosh et al.
2006).
Some statisticians describe themselves as Bayesian while at the same time
advocating Fisherian statistical signiﬁcance tests, and some even suggest that
“the idea of Bayesian inference as inductive, culminating in the computation
of the posterior probability of scientiﬁc hypotheses, has had malign effects on
statistical practice” (Gelman and Shalizi 2010) (see the contribution by Andrew
Gelman). Philosophers of science are legitimately called upon to sort things
out. It seems altogether possible that elements of current practice are implicitly
disinterring frequentist roots, even as these roots are unaccompanied by a clear
recognition of their statistical philosophy.
3.6 Classic Criticisms of ‘Classic’ Frequentist Methods
In declaring that the philosophical doctor is in (section 1.7), I identiﬁed two key
areas around which to organize foundational issues: the roles of probability in
induction, and the nature and goals of statistical inference in science or learning.
Two implicit assumptions underlie the criticisms of frequentist accounts:
First, there is the supposition that an adequate account must provide hy-
potheses with degrees of probability, an assumption often called probabilism.
Second, there is the assumption that the sole role of error-statistical meth-
ods is to appraise techniques according to their long-run error rates (however
deﬁned). This assumption may be dubbed the radical behavioristic interpreta-
tion.
Criticism then follows easily: Error probabilities do not give posterior prob-
abilities to hypotheses, and methods that satisfy low long-run error probability
requirements may be counterintuitive.Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science 93
It will be evident that I reject both presuppositions that underlie the criti-
cisms.
3.6.1 Probabilism
There are really only two or three variations on the ensuing criticisms. The ﬁrst
charge is based on the assumption that probability must arise to assess posterior
probabilities. Were the results actually adequate for quantifying something like
rational belief that would be one thing, but by and large, they are not. Still, it is
a basic assumption that many apparently feel is not in need of justiﬁcation.
Standard Bayesian textbooks make obligatory claims based on analogies
with games of chance: Since probability is used to quantify how strongly an
uncertain event is ‘expected’ to occur in the context of a probabilistically mod-
eled game of chance, probability should also be used to quantify the evidential
warrant for a hypothesis H, even where they too regard H as correct or incor-
rect (about this one universe). It seems to me that there is confusion between
‘expecting an event’ to occur and expecting a hypothesis H to be true. Even if
scientists were in the business of betting on the truth of hypotheses, there is an
entirely different role for statistics in ascertaining what has been learned about
a given phenomenon. This is the role, I argue, for controlling and assessing how
precisely or severely given hypotheses have (and have not) passed tests with
data.
In some cases, of course, a parameter has a legitimate prior probability dis-
tribution. Even then, however, it is not clear that one ought to employ it for
the inference at hand. Moreover, some deny that such a computation should
even count as performing a Bayesian analysis, as opposed to simply applying
conditional probability (Fraser forthcoming).
Trivial Intervals. One way the probabilist assumption leads to classic criti-
cisms is by assuming that error probabilities are intended to supply post-data
degrees of belief in hypotheses. So, if, for example, the result of applying a 95-
percent conﬁdence interval estimation procedure happens to be known as a true
estimate, then this demonstrates ‘unsoundness’ of frequentist methods.
Now frequentists have been pointing out for over half a century that a con-
ﬁdence level is not a posterior probability assignable to a resulting estimate
(which is correct or incorrect); nevertheless, they too tend to accept the criticism,
or at least seem uncomfortable with these examples. An exception is David Cox,
who has no problem allowing that in some cases none of the parameter values
can be ruled out with any stringency. The severity construal concurs.
3.6.2 Radical Behaviorism
The second assumption gives rise to what are regarded as the strongest grounds
for preferring some variety of the Bayesian to the frequentist error-statistical
method: namely, that the Bayesian avoids the counterintuitive and paradoxical
results that the frequentist (supposedly) licenses. In the spirit of Jim Berger, I
will admit ﬂat out that the frequentists are not blameless. With few exceptions
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tional problems and puzzles, even where critics take them as sufﬁcient grounds
for rejecting the frequentist approach altogether.
To give the most generous reading: the classic paradoxes are easy to make
out if one assumes the most radical type of behaviorism, beyond anything that
even Neyman endorsed in his most behavioristic moments. This assumes that
the frequentist error-statistical requirement is satisﬁed so long as on average
the method has good long-run error probabilities. So even if one scale is terrible
and the others highly reliable, the frequentist, it is imagined, is happy to av-
erage them together in reporting on the warrant for a weighing, even once the
scale used is known. (So using my broken scale is not too bad if I can claim that
most of the time I use a reliable scale.) But why suppose the frequentist statisti-
cian is stuck advocating such counterintuitive applications? Certainly reporting
the average will incorrectly report how well (e.g., how severely) the hypothesis
has actually passed the test with the experiment producing x.
So, having embarked on our meeting ground, we are led to examine very
carefully these old chestnuts and ‘hysterical’ examples laid at the frequentist,
error-statistical door. Since the same counterexamples are given by Bayesians
who view themselves as neither subjectivists nor default Bayesians nor uniﬁ-
cationists, the analysis is widely applicable to the foundational portions of all
Bayesian textbooks.
4. How to Scrutinize Statistical Methods Philosophically
Both statisticians and philosophers of science have an interest in scrutinizing
the philosophical basis of a statistical or other inductive method (even if they
go about it in different ways). Here, one asks how to interpret and justify the
method in the light of its intended goals. Given our focus on science and learn-
ing, this involves epistemological goals—goals of learning or knowledge or, as I
prefer, simply ﬁnding things out. In scrutinizing a statistical account at a philo-
sophical or foundational level, we (do or should) ask: Does it provide an adequate
characterization of scientiﬁc reasoning, evidence, inference, testing?
4.1 Criteria for the Philosophical Scrutiny of Methods
I propose some criteria for answering this question. A ﬁrst pair of requirements
for an adequate methodology are:
1. It should be ascertainable (it must be able to be applied); and
2. It should be adequate and relevant to the tasks required of the inference
tools.
These two criteria are interrelated: If it is assumed that an adequate account
must supply posterior probabilities to hypotheses, then a frequentist account
that assigns only probabilities to events will fall down on the adequacy criterion.
However, for posterior probabilities to be ascertainable, it is necessary to give
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to the data so as to apply Bayes’s theorem. The question arises as to how to
understand these priors so as to be both ascertainable and relevant to scientiﬁc
inference.
If they are given by a choice of language or are looked up in a manual of pri-
ors, as default Bayesians recommend, then while they are in some sense imper-
sonal, their relevance for predicting and understanding empirical phenomena is
unclear. Frequentist methods (signiﬁcance tests and conﬁdence intervals) are
ascertainable at least for a cluster of problems, but how are their long-run error
rates relevant in the case of appraising the evidence for a particular scientiﬁc
inference?
As an outgrowth of number 2, we may identify a third requirement:
3. The methodology should not be in conﬂict with intuitions about inductive
inference or science or evidence.
Moreover, it must have a principled, and not an ad hoc, way to avoid any coun-
terintuitive results.
This is a slippery business but it cannot be avoided. Satisfying intuitions
about induction and evidence clearly depends on the intended aims of the tools.
For example, in appraising Carnapian attempts to arrive at a priori inductive
logics there was an appeal to ‘inductive intuition’. On this ground, those Car-
napian c-functions that result in no learning from positive instances are discred-
ited. Another intuitive principle might be to ‘use all relevant evidence’, even
though notions of relevance differ. But there are far murkier areas where induc-
tive intuitions are unclear, or are intimately tied to background philosophical
theories.
Right away we are confronted with issues that depend upon contrasting
‘philosophical theories’. Because of this, a philosophical scrutiny may be guilty of
imposing its own philosophy on the interpretation of methods. Thus, the threat
of circularity looms large in embarking on our mission. Without a separate
defense of the philosophical theory that underlies one’s foundational scrutiny,
there is a danger that the philosophical scrutiny will be question-begging, as
often occurs.
Thus, in saying that we recognize the role of intuition in the philosophical
scrutiny of methods, we do not mean that there is no justiﬁcation for them. Quite
the opposite: by unearthing these intuitions we can subject them to scrutiny as
well.
4.2 How Might Philosophers Construe Ascertainability?
In proposing as a ﬁrst criterion ‘ascertainability’, my requirements seem to con-
tradict a still-common manner by which philosophers set out accounts of induc-
tive inference (once called theories of conﬁrmation, now known as work in formal
epistemology). Some view the task in a manner analogous to that of deductive
logic. Just as deductive logic tells us that if certain premises are true, then
conclusion H follows with certainty, inductive logic would tell us that if certain
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assumed to be well modeled by the probability calculus. As Kyburg puts it (1993,
150), neo-Bayesianism is “yet another effort to convert induction to deduction”
in the form of a deductive calculus of probabilities. According to Howson and
Urbach (1989, 272),
“The Bayesian theory of support is a theory of how the acceptance as
true of some evidential statement affects your belief in some hypoth-
esis. How you came to accept the truth of the evidence, and whether
you are correct in accepting it as true, are matters which, from the
point of view of the theory, are simply irrelevant.”
4.2.1 Beyond Validity to Soundness
Howson and Urbach’s view of the task of a philosophical account of inductive in-
ference contrasts with what is sought by an account of ampliative inference, or
learning from data. To begin with, an adequate account needs to provide guid-
ance for accepting the evidence. In Bayesian philosophy of science especially, the
evidence statement is not restricted to a speciﬁc statistical model (not that ac-
cepting its adequacy is trivial either). Second, since accepting the evidence is not
itself a probabilistic inference—it is accepted ﬂat out—at the very least a (non-
Bayesian) account of acceptance is needed. Moreover, an ampliative account, at
least as I shall view it, requires guidance in detaching claims, whatever form it
is to take. Probability theory is deductive all right, but in reducing statistical
inference to an application of probability theory, we are missing the inductive
component.
Even the strictest deductivist must still wish to apply the valid logical ar-
guments, to obtain ones that are sound or approximately so. This requires af-
ﬁrming premises as at least approximately true, and appealing to methods that,
while error-prone, are at least capable of reliably detecting and correcting errors.
4.2.2 Ascertaining Probabilities in the Philosophy and History of Science
I am not claiming that it is the business of the philosopher to tell us how to apply
the methods, rather, that it is his or her business to characterize the methods
in such a way that scientists could reasonably be supposed to apply them, given
limited knowledge in actual contexts. So, for instance, if the method required
logical omniscience, it would be a weakness (not necessarily a killing one). Or, if
a subjective Bayesian account depended upon elicitations based on betting sce-
narios, and these were found problematic in science, that would be a weakness
in the ascertainability department.
On the other hand, if philosophers of science are proposing the methodology
as a way to appraise the rationality of scientiﬁc episodes, then they should be
able to apply it. To illustrate, here is one of the issues that has arisen with re-
spect to the ‘problem of old evidence’ in determining subjective probabilities: If
known evidence is given probability one, then evidence cannot raise the prob-
ability to a hypothesis. To avoid this, Bayesian philosophers propose to sub-
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if this would require philosophers of science to have studied the history of sci-
ence deeply enough “to make a judgment as to what their degrees of belief would
have been in relevant historical periods” (Glymour 1980, 91). To claim merely
to be reconstructing the views of scientists, on the other hand, would rob the
philosophical account of any normative force.
5. Bayesian Epistemology, Probability ‘Logics’, and
Statistical Science
How shall we understand the meeting ground between statistical science and
current work in so-called formal epistemology? Is it inapplicable here?
Analytic epistemology has always limited itself to conceptual analysis of
what it means to believe or know various claims, and the formal epistemolo-
gist may see him or herself merely as replacing the traditional ‘Agent S believes
that H’ with a probabilistic rendering, e.g., ‘S assigns a high degree of proba-
bility in H’. Does it follow then that the formal epistemologist is absolved from
taking account of the applicability of the formal methods? If probability is being
used to refer to the probability calculus, then I will argue that the answer is no;
and I want to devote this section to this question. While it is one that is likely
to be of interest mainly to philosophers of science, it is too important to a large
segment of current work on probabilistic inference by philosophers to overlook.
5.1 Using Probability and Statistics in Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of science often use probability on the ‘meta-level’, as it were.
Suppose, for instance, that one starts out with the plausible notion that evi-
dence e conﬁrms a claim H if one believes (or ought to believe?) H more strongly
given e than prior to being given evidence e, and assumes that conditional prob-
ability is a way to abbreviate this. Then we get a kind of primitive or a priori
claim, i.e., e conﬁrms H iff P(Hje)È P(H). The claim is tautologous but also un-
informative. But I do not think contemporary Bayesian epistemologists would
readily accept that their work is purely a priori.
Bayesian epistemologists seem to wish to claim that there is a place for ap-
pealing to probability and statistics in order to get at overarching principles of
evidence and logic, and, further, that these principles are informative (and nor-
mative) about evidence and inquiry. I am anxious to agree. For this opens the
door to at least one of the shared platforms that I would have them step onto.
5.2 A Principle of Good Experimental Design
Colin Howson, who may be credited with the move back to the logics of induction
in the late 1990s, makes it clear that he regards Bayesian reconstructions as
informative for science.98 Deborah G. Mayo
“[Bayes’s theorem] tells us that the P(Hje) is sensitive to the propor-
tional degree to which e is explained by H as opposed to any other
plausible alternative hypotheses. This expresses a basic principle of
good experimental design: it should be very unlikely that the sought
effect e can be attributed to any cause other than H itself.” (Howson
1997)
This principle is to be captured by the fact that p(Hje) is high to the extent
that p(ejnot-H) is low, at least in comparison to p(ejH). P(ejnot-H) may be
called the Bayesian-catchall factor, not-H being all hypotheses in the denial of
H. The experimental principle is ﬁne; the problem is supposing that Bayesian
machinery supplies it. First, there is the ascertainability problem: arriving at
an assignment for the Bayesian catchall would seem to require knowing the
future of science, as Wesley Salmon (1966) puts it.
Second, and most important, even in the best cases (i.e., the model is correct,
the alternatives are exhaustive), a low value for p(ejnot-H) does not supply the
causal or explanatory claim that Howson seeks, to wit, that it is unlikely that
the effect e can be attributed to any cause other than H itself. The correct intu-
ition, on the other hand, is easily shown to be captured by the error-probabilistic
computation.
5.2.1 A Minimal Principle of Evidence
To explain, let us abbreviate:
(1) It is (very) unlikely that ‘the effect of interest’ is caused by something other
than H.
A good principle of experimental inference is to regard e as evidence of H only
when (or only to the extent that) (1) holds. For suppose that (1) is violated, and
it is likely that ‘the effect of interest’ is caused by something other than H.
To claim that e is evidence of H when it is likely that e is attributable to
causes other than H (i.e., when (1) is violated) is to follow an inference method
with a high probability of being in error. So this would be a very unreliable rule
to follow, and H has scarcely passed a stringent or severe test. But this is pre-
cisely the ‘minimal principle of evidence’ that is at the heart of error-statistical
methods.
I propose to allow that both Bayesian and error-statistical philosophies of
science would wish to uphold this principle. This provides a shared meeting
ground coextensive with current foundational issues of statistical science. A
philosophical appraisal of the two statistical philosophies will turn on how well
each can capture and further such intuitively plausible principles of scientiﬁc
learning. If, as I argue, it turns out that error-statistical methods do a better
job of supplying methods to satisfy such evidential principles, then this would
be a fundamental advantage of the account. From this perspective, oft-repeated
criticisms of frequentist methods appear in a different light. Notably, disagree-
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cases where this minimal principle of evidence is violated! (See Kent Staley’s
contribution.)
5.2.2 Roles of Randomized Trials
Recognizing that an adequate account must be able to satisfy the minimal prin-
ciple for evidence illuminates corresponding debates about the roles of method-
ological procedures, such as randomized clinical trials—of increasing interest to
philosophers of science (see Senn 2007).
5.3 Getting beyond a Package of Superﬁciality (Upshot of Section 5)
If much if not most of the work on probability in philosophy of science comes
under formal epistemology, and if this enterprise has no need to meet up with
statistical methods and their problems, then my meeting ground might seem
not to apply to a large segment of this work. I argue that this is a mistake.
Especially ironic about this divorce from practice is that it forfeits a central tool
for making progress on debates that formal epistemologists care about. Rather
than use statistical ideas to answer questions about the methodology of scien-
tiﬁc inference, the Bayesian epistemologist starts out by assuming the intuition
or principle, the task then being the ‘homework problem’ of assigning priors and
likelihoods that are in sync with the principle. At times this demands beating a
Bayesian analysis into line to ﬁt the intuitive principle, while still not getting at
its genuine rationale (e.g., with respect to problems of irrelevant conjunctions,
and justifying novelty requirements). “The idea of putting probabilities over
hypotheses delivered to philosophy a godsend, and an entire package of superﬁ-
ciality.” (Glymour 2010, 334)
It follows that formal epistemologists cannot blithely assume to be produc-
ing useful rules for science (even at the meta-level) without considering how to
cash them out. Plausible principles of evidence might be supposed to be well
captured by a given methodology until one asks if the computational compo-
nents are ascertainable by statistical methods. In so doing, the features of the
methods themselves cannot be ignored; nor can any foundational problems sur-
rounding them. Carving out a statistical science-philosophy of science meeting
ground is therefore important to all statistical foundations research.
6. Concluding Remarks
If we are to make progress in resolving decades-old controversies which still
shake the foundations of statistics, and go on to tackle new ones, I have claimed,
we need to dig (or drill?) not shallowly but deeply, a task that requires both
statistical and philosophical acumen.
A place to look to meet directly with a host of current foundational prob-
lems are the discussions and reactions to ‘uniﬁcations’, or ‘reconciliations’, of
Bayesian and frequentist methods. The purported uniﬁcations represent two100 Deborah G. Mayo
kinds of ‘meetings’: between frequentist and Bayesian methods, but also be-
tween statistical methodology and epistemology of science. Upon analysis, the
uniﬁcations are seen to be at odds with both Bayesian and frequentist goals.
Even those who pay obeisance to subjective Bayesianism at a ‘philosophical’
level admit that the statistical methods that actually are used to ﬁnd things
out take a very different form. What then is the statistical philosophy associ-
ated with those methods that serve learning? Ironically many seem prepared
to allow that Bayesianism still gets it right for epistemology, even as statistical
practice calls for methods more closely aligned with frequentist principles. What
I would like the reader to consider is that what is right for epistemology is also
what is right for statistical learning in practice.
That is, statistical inference in practice deserves its own epistemology. I have
suggested one way to characterize and develop this error-statistical epistemol-
ogy based on the use of error-statistical methods for assessing and controlling
the severity of tests. This statistical philosophy is akin to Cox’s view that sig-
niﬁcance tests give a reliable way to use data to indicate how discrepant (and
how concordant) a null hypothesis is from the correct understanding of an as-
pect of a phenomenon of interest, as modeled statistically (Cox and Mayo 2010).
The relevant quantities are in terms of degrees of reliability and precision, and
degrees of discordance and accordance, rather than degrees of belief or conﬁrma-
tion of hypotheses. The resulting epistemology, I argue, is also more appropriate
for the uses to which philosophers of science put statistical methods: to model
scientiﬁc inference, solve problems about evidence and inference, and critique
methodological principles (metamethodology).
But what matters is not whether those engaged in foundational discussions
concur with the statistical philosophy I put forward. It sufﬁces that readers rec-
ognize that the current situation presents a predicament in need of philosophical
illumination, which is the rationale for these forums. In the late 1970s, Lindley
said somewhere that the foundations of statistics were so important that every-
one should stop what they were doing and sort them out for a couple of years.
The same call might be made in 2011 and beyond.
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